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Abstract
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is a code reuse attack
that chains short snippets of existing code to perform arbitrary
operations on target machines. Existing detection methods
against ROP exhibit unsatisfactory detection accuracy and/or
have high runtime overhead.
In this paper, we present ROPNN, which innovatively com-
bines address space layout guided disassembly and deep neu-
ral networks to detect ROP payloads. The disassembler treats
application input data as code pointers and aims to find any
potential gadget chains, which are then classified by a deep
neural network as benign or malicious. Our experiments show
that ROPNN has high detection rate (99.3%) and a very low
false positive rate (0.01%). ROPNN successfully detects all of
the 100 real-world ROP exploits that are collected in-the-wild,
created manually or created by ROP exploit generation tools.
Additionally, ROPNN detects all 10 ROP exploits that can
bypass Bin-CFI. ROPNN is non-intrusive and does not incur
any runtime overhead to the protected program.
1 Introduction
Due to broad deployment of W⊕X or Data Execution Pre-
vention (DEP) [1, 2], code injection attacks (e.g., shellcode
injection) are no longer very viable. Code reuse attacks, es-
pecially return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks [3–6],
have recently risen to play the role code injection attacks
used to play. A ROP attack proceeds with two phases. First,
the attacker identifies a set of particular machine instruction
sequences (i.e., “gadgets") that are elaborately selected from
a binary executable or a shared library. Each gadget typically
ends in a return instruction. Second, enabled by exploiting a
(buffer overflow) vulnerability, the attacker overwrites part of
the stack with the addresses of these gadgets; the addresses
and register operands are placed at particular locations (on
the stack) so that these gadgets will be executed sequentially
if the control flow is directed to the first one. By chaining gad-
gets together, the attacker is often able to perform arbitrary
operations on the target machine [6].
Since ROP attacks are a major threat to business-critical
server programs, extensive researches have been conducted to
defend against ROP attacks. The existing defenses focus on
two perspectives, namely prevention and detection. ROP pre-
vention methods aim to make launching a ROP attack itself
very difficult. For example, ASLR (Address Space Layout
Randomization) randomizes the memory addresses to make it
difficult for an attacker to accurately locate any ROP gadgets.
However, ASLR suffers from various forms of information
leakage [7–9], code inference [10] and indirect profiling at-
tacks [11], which significantly undermine the protection.
On the other hand, ROP detection methods aim to catch the
ROP attack in action and then stop it. For example, CFI (Con-
trol Flow Integrity) checks whether the control flow transfer
violates the CFG (Control Flow Graph). If so, the program is
terminated. Existing ROP detection methods can be divided
into six classes: (1A) Heuristics-based detection [12–14].
(1B) Fine-grained CFI [15–17]. (1C) Signature-based detec-
tion [18]. (1D) Speculative code execution [19]. (1E) Search-
ing code pointers in the data region [20]. (1F) Statistical-based
detection [21, 22].
Unfortunately, these methods are still quite limited in meet-
ing four highly-desired requirements: (R1) high detection rate
for ROP attacks; (R2) close to zero false positive rate; (R3)
acceptable runtime overhead; (R4) minimal changes to the
protected programs and the running environment.
In fact, (a) Class 1A and 1C detection methods could result
in low detection rates; specific heuristics or signatures are
found not very hard to bypass. (b) Class 1B and 1D detection
methods could cause substantial runtime overhead. (c) Class
1A, 1B, 1D, and 1F detection methods may cause substantial
changes to existing (legacy) application software and even the
running environment, thus they are not transparent. (Please
refer to Section 2.2 for detailed discussion.) As a result, none
of the existing ROP detection methods satisfy the above four
requirements.
In recent years, deep neural network sees applications in
the security field, e.g., fuzzing [23], log analysis [24], mem-
ory forensic [25], etc. Deep neural network has several clear
advantages over traditional machine learning methods, for
example it provides better accuracy than conventional models
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Detection Methods R1 R2 R3 R4
Heuristic-based × X X ×
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) X X × ×
Signature-based × X X X
Speculative code execution X X × ×
Searching code pointers in the data region × X X X
Statistical-based detection × X X ×
Table 1: Limitations of existing detection methods against
ROP attacks.
like Support Vector Machine (SVM); it does not require ex-
pert knowledge to set thresholds for classification (detection)
criteria; it does not require traditional feature engineering and
can be trained end-to-end using minimally preprocessed data.
In this paper, we study whether these advantages could be
leveraged to address the aforementioned limitations of exist-
ing ROP payload detection methods. In particular, we propose
a new ROP payload detection method, ROPNN, which is the
first to satisfy all of the above four requirements via deep
learning. Regarding how ROPNN works, firstly, our method is
used as a “classification engine” to build a new kind of net-
work Intrusion Detection System (IDS). It can be deployed in
the same way as a conventional network IDS such as Snort.
Secondly, once deployed, our method works in the following
manner: when network packets arrive and a reassembled pro-
tocol data unit (PDU) is obtained, our method takes two steps.
(Step 1) Our method does ASL-guided PDU (i.e., application
input data) disassembly and obtains a set of potential gadget
chains. (Step 2) The potential gadget chains obtained in Step
1 are fed into a neural network classifier. The classifier identi-
fies each potential gadget chain as either “ROP payload" or
“benign data”.
As we will show shortly in Section 7, ROPNN achieves
very high detection rate (99.3%) and very low false positive
rate (0.01%), which satisfy R1 and R2. Meanwhile, since
ROPNN can be deployed on a separate machine other than
the protected server, it requires no changes to the protected
program or the running environment (R4). ROPNN also has
no runtime overhead for the protected program (R3), which
is an advantage over many other methods.
Despite the successful applications of deep neural network
in other security problems [23–25], ROPNN still faces several
unique domain-specific challenges. Firstly, a deep neural net-
work must be trained with proper data. Since ROP payloads
only contain addresses of ROP gadget chains (please refer to
Section 2.1), we should not train a classifier to directly distin-
guish ROP payloads from benign data. Otherwise, the signal-
to-noise ratio is so low that the accuracy can be very poor.
Instead, we propose ASL-guided disassembly (Section 4) and
create gadget-chain-like instruction sequences based on the
addresses identified in benign data. In section 5, we also pro-
pose a viable method to generate sufficient real gadget chains.
Simply put, the two datasets are both a set of instruction se-
quences and we train a classifier to distinguish the two. Also,
to obtain comprehensive and representative benign training
samples, we do ASL-guided disassembly on TB-level amount
of raw input data (HTTP traffic, images, PDFs). We obtain
26k-105k benign training samples for different programs.
Secondly, we need to design a customized deep neural
network for the detection of ROP payloads. We propose to
use a convolutional neural network (CNN) as our classifier as
it is good at capturing spatial structure and local dependencies.
This corresponds to the nature of a ROP gadget chain that
gadgets are chained with orders and adjacent instructions in
a chain have meaningful connections with each other. These
orders and connections in turn indicate whether the instruction
sequence is indeed a real gadget chain or is formed merely
due to the coincidental addresses in the data.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose ROPNN, a novel method for a network IDS to
use in detecting ROP payloads. It combines ASL-guided
disassembly and deep learning to classify reassembled
PDU into either “ROP payload" or “benign data".
• To the best of our knowledge, ROPNN is the first in-
trusion detection method that applies deep learning to
mitigate the threat of ROP attacks. It sheds light on the
applicability of deep learning to software system security
problems.
• We have designed and implemented ROPNN on Linux.
We test it with several programs (e.g., Nginx). The eval-
uation results show that ROPNN achieves very high de-
tection rate (99.3%) and very low false positive rate
(0.01%). More importantly, it can detect real-world ROP
exploits collected in-the-wild and generated by widely-
used exploit generation tools. We collect and create 100
real-world ROP exploits for a total of five vulnerable
programs and ROPNN successfully detects all of them.
Additionally, ROPNN detects all 10 ROP exploits that
can bypass Bin-CFI. Meanwhile, ROPNN does not re-
quire changes to the program or the running environment.
It also incurs no runtime overhead to the protected pro-
gram.
2 Background
2.1 ROP Attacks
Despite years of effort to mitigate the threat, ROP attack
remains a widely used method to launch exploits [26–29]. In a
typical ROP attack, an attacker carefully crafts a gadget chain
and embeds the addresses of the gadgets in a network packet.
This packet exploits a vulnerability in the server program and
causes the gadget to be executed one by one. Figure 1 shows
the relationship of the network packet payload, the overflowed
stack, and the program’s memory address space layout. In fact,
this comes from the blind ROP attack [30], which exploits a
stack buffer overflow vulnerability in Nginx 1.4.0. As we can
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Figure 1: Relationship between network packet payload, stack
layout, and address space layout
see, the addresses of gadgets (e.g., 0x804c51c, 0x804c69a)
are embedded in the network packet. This relationship is an
intrinsic characteristic of ROP attacks and it motivates us to
search for addresses of potential gadgets in input data and
then disassemble the corresponding instructions.
On the other hand, since only the address of ROP gadgets
are contained in the ROP payloads, we should not directly
label ROP payloads and benign data and then train a classifier
on the two – because the signal-to-noise ratio is too low and
it is difficult to train an accurate classifier.
2.2 Existing Detection Methods against ROP
Attacks
In this subsection, we classify the existing detection methods
against ROP attacks into six categories and explain why they
fail to meet the four requirements set in Section 1.
Heuristic-based detection methods look for abnormal ex-
ecution patterns. DROP [12] checks whether the frequency
of executed return instructions exceeds a certain threshold.
kBouncer [14] and ROPecker [13] detect abnormal pattern
of indirect branches. Although these methods can detect con-
ventional ROP attacks, they leverage certain heuristic-based
thresholds as critical detection criteria. Göktas¸ et al. point out
in [31] that they can be bypassed by carefully constructed
gadget chains which violate the defender’s assumptions.
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [32–36] involves two steps,
i.e., detection and response. CFI detects whether any con-
trol flow transfer violates the pre-defined control flow graph
(CFG). If so, it terminates the program. Theoretically, CFI
can detect all ROP attacks since they inevitably violate the
CFG. However, due to the difficulty of point-to analysis, ob-
taining a perfect CFG is difficult (if not impossible) [37].
In practice, coarse-grained CFI implementations adopt an
approximated CFG, which is not as secure as it should be.
Consequently, attackers can leverage the extra edges in the
CFG to bypass them [34, 38–40]. On the other hand, fine-
grained CFI provides a strong security guarantee at the cost
of significantly high runtime overhead; e.g., 19% in [16] and
52% in [17], which is impractical. Meanwhile, CFI requires
either instrumentation to the program binary or modifications
to the compiler.
There are also signature-based detection methods against
ROP, i.e., n-ROPdetector [18]. n-ROPdetector checks whether
a set of addresses of API functions appear in network traffic.
While this method can detect some ROP attacks, the address
of APIs can be masqueraded to evade the detection. For ex-
ample, an attacker can represent an address as the sum of two
integers, and calculate the address at runtime.
Speculative-code-execution-based detection (ROP-
scan [19]) searches network traffic or files for any code
pointers and starts speculative code execution from the
corresponding instruction. If four or more consecutive gadget
chains can be successfully executed, ROPscan considers
the input data as a ROP exploit. Note the threshold four is
empirically determined in the experiment; however, check my
profile [20] finds that benign data can produce a gadget chain
that has up to six gadgets. Meanwhile, real gadget chains
need not to be very long to be useful. Thus the selection of
the threshold is challenging. In fact, this also motivates the
use of deep neural network as a classifier because no such
thresholds need to be provided.
Check my profile [20] statically analyzes the data region
and looks for any code pointers that form potential gadget
chains. To avoid false positives, it checks whether the gadget
chain eventually calls an API function – which most useful
exploits will do. Unfortunately, due to the nature of static
analysis, the detection can be bypassed when the address of
API function is masqueraded, e.g., as a sum of two integers.
Statistical-based detection methods [21,22] first extract cer-
tain meta-information (e.g., micro-architectural events) about
the program execution and then train a statistical machine
learning model (e.g., SVM) to distinguish ordinary execution
from ROP gadget chain execution. They can detect various
types of ROP attacks. However, they require instrumentation
to acquire such information. Moreover, they use relatively
small training dataset, which leaves plenty of spaces for im-
provement. For example, EigenROP [22] achieves 80% detec-
tion rate and 0.8% false positive rate, whereas we get 99.3%
detection rate and 0.01% false positive rate. Note our false
positive rate means 0.01% of the potential gadget chains, and
the number of such chains is significantly smaller the number
of program inputs (see Section 7), so our accuracy is much
better than EigenROP.
3 Overview
If a PDU does not contain any 4-byte (8-byte) value which
points to an instruction in a 32-bit (64-bit) system, the PDU
is certainly not a ROP payload. Otherwise, the PDU is suspi-
cious. A main challenge for detecting ROP payloads is that
most suspicious PDUs are actually benign. Now we need to
accurately judge if a suspicious PDU is a ROP payload or not.
Since creative zero-day ROP attack scripts could be invented
at any time, no IDS knows all the essential features of ROP
attacks. This key observation reveals a fundamental limitation
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Figure 2: Workflow of ROPNN
of the ROP detection methods that rely on known features
(e.g., abnormal patterns of indirect branches, addresses of
API functions being contained in a PDU); it also indicates
that an evasion-resilient intrusion detection method should be
feature-free. A main reason on why we leverage deep learning
is that such learning models do not require any attack features
to be explicitly identified.
Figure 2 illustrates the workflow of our proposed ROPNN.
Overall, our approach has two phases: the training phase
and the production phase. During the training phase, we
first collect two training datasets, namely the gadget-chain-
like instruction sequences and the real gadget chains. We
get the gadget-chain-like instruction sequences by Address
Space Layout (ASL)-guided disassembly (of the protected
program’s memory dump) based on the valid addresses iden-
tified in the benign input data. We extract real gadget chains
from the protected program by chaining individual gadgets.
Note by instruction we mean both opcode and operands (if
any). We then train a deep neural network to classify the two
datasets. Specifically, we choose to use a three-layer convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) and represent the instructions
byte-by-byte using one-hot encoding (Section 6.1).
During the production phase, after a PDU is obtained (re-
assembled), we first identify any valid addresses contained in
the PDU. Then we use the addresses to perform ASL-guided
disassembly, which will result in a set of potential gadget
chains. After that, we send each of them to the trained CNN.
A warning is raised if any of these potential gadget chains is
classified as real ROP attack. Conversely, if the ASL-guided
disassembly does not produce a potential gadget chain, or the
chain is classified as benign by the CNN, the input data is
considered benign.
Note we do need a classifier as part of the ROPNN because
if we treat all of the inputs that have addresses in it as ROP
payloads, we can cause high false positive rate and substantial
denial of service. Meanwhile, the ASL-guided disassembly is
also necessary because otherwise the signal-to-noise ratio is
very low. An HTTP request can be as large as a 2MB image.
However, suppose a ROP gadget chain has 20 gadgets, then
only 20 addresses are present in the payload, which means 80
bytes. Viewing ROP payloads as a “haystack”, the addresses
embedded in by an attacker are in fact some “needles”. If we
treat a whole payload as a training sample, then any trained
neural network will very likely be primarily capturing the
features of the haystack instead of the needles. If this is the
case, a very low classification accuracy is unavoidable.
We choose CNN as the classifier because ASL-guided dis-
assembly outputs instruction sequences which have strong
spatial structures and local dependencies. The appearance
of pairs of instructions and the orders of instructions could
indicate different nature of an instruction sequence. CNN
can represent the abstract nature (e.g., benign or real gadget
chain) into compositions of simpler concepts (e.g., locations
of instructions), which is important for the classification.
This unique combination of ASL-guided assembly and
CNN enables us to solve the ROP payload detection problem
without any software instrumentation. The only thing that the
ROPNN needs to know about is a memory dump of the pro-
tected program. If we train a classifier to distinguish ordinary
execution trace from ROP gadget chain execution trace, we
need software instrumentation to monitor the execution trace,
which is against our goal.
4 ASL-Guided Disassembly and Gadget-
Chain-Like Instruction Sequences Genera-
tion
This section describes the details about the ASL-guided dis-
assembly. ASL-guided disassembly treats bytes in data as
addresses and checks if they point to gadget-like or gadget-
chain-like instruction sequences. In the training phase, we
use ASL-guided disassembly to collect gadget-chain-like in-
struction sequences as training data for the neural network.
In the production phase, we use ASL-guided disassembly to
identify any potential gadget chain in input data.
4.1 Disassembly of Individual Addresses
We first create a memory dump of the protected program.
The memory dump contains the addresses and contents of
all memory pages that are marked as executable. Oftentimes,
these pages are mapped from the text segment of the pro-
tected program or any loaded shared libraries (e.g., libc.so,
etc). The ROP gadgets must fall inside the memory dump,
otherwise it is not executable and the attack will fail.
Then we consider every four bytes (on 32-bit system)1 in
the input data as an address. If an address does not appear
inside any one of the dumped pages, we ignore it because it
cannot be the start of a ROP gadget. Here we do not limit our
search space to non-randomized modules because attackers
can bypass the ASLR in multiple ways.
1In this paper, we only consider 32 bit systems and leave it for a future
work to experiment with 64 bit systems.
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We start disassembling from any identified addresses us-
ing Capstone [41]. The disassembling can stop in two ways:
(1). An invalid or privileged instruction is encountered or the
disassembly reaches the end of code segment. In this case,
the current address is ignored in subsequent analysis. (2). An
indirect branch, i.e., ret, jmp, or call is encountered. Then
the instruction sequence (from the instruction at the starting
address all the way to the indirect branch) is considered a
gadget-like instruction sequence.
4.2 “Chaining” of Gadget-Like Instruction
Sequences
Having obtained the set of gadget-like instruction sequences,
we need to figure out how they could be chained together,
in a similar way as an attacker chains gadgets into a gadget
chain. Specifically, if we find an address at offset n in the data
which points to a gadget-like instruction sequence, we check
if any one of the next ten addresses, i.e., address at n + 4,
n + 8, n + 12,...,n + 40 in the data also points to a gadget-
like instruction sequence. If so, we “chain” it together with
the previous gadget-like instruction sequence and repeat the
process. Otherwise, we end the “chaining” process.
For any “chain” that has at least two addresses, we collect
the corresponding gadget-like instruction sequences and con-
catenate them into a gadget-chain-like instruction sequence.
Note the maximum ten is determined according to the obser-
vation that most gadgets in our dataset only pop less than five
integers from the stack to the registers, and all of them pop
less than ten integers; so ten is sufficient to capture the next
address in a “chain”. In other words, a ROP attack cannot
spread the addresses of gadget chains in the payload arbitrar-
ily; otherwise, even if the control flow is successfully hijacked,
the subsequent gadgets will not execute one by one – because
upon return from the previous gadget, the address of the next
address is not on the top of the stack.
When we look for the next “chain”, we skip the addresses
and the corresponding instruction sequences that are already
part of a “gadget chain”. For example, if a “chain” contains
five “gadgets”, next we start from the sixth address and re-
peat the “chaining” process. We repeat the process on every
address to collect all possible gadget-chain-like instruction
sequence. In this way, we get the first training dataset.
To efficiently implement the above algorithm, we start mul-
tiple parallel threads to analyze different addresses. Moreover,
if an address is already examined and found to be pointing
to a gadget-like instruction sequence, we cache it in a global
table. In this way, the disassembly and analysis is not repeated
on the same address. Besides, we also process multiple inputs
simultaneously to utilize all CPU cores.
The reader may take Figure 1 as an example of the ASL-
guided disassembly during the production phase. Suppose
we start from offset n of the data, we first encounter a candi-
date address 0x456af094. We find this address is not inside
the memory dump, which indicates it is not mapped or not
marked as executable in the protected program, so we move
on to the next 4 bytes starting at offset n+0x04. The next
two addresses are 0x41414141 and they both do not lead to a
potential gadget chain. Next, we move to offset n+0x0c and
process 0x0804c69a. Note this address is inside the memory
dump and we start disassembling from it. The result is a po-
tential gadget with three instructions: pop esi; pop edi;
ret;. We continue the process and then identify two other
addresses (0x080bcbec, 0x0804c51c) and their corresponding
instructions. Eventually, we end up with a potential gadget
chain with three gadgets (pop esi; pop edi; ret; pop
eax; ret; pop esi; pop edi; pop ebp; ret;). In the
training phase, however, when we collect gadget-chain-like-
instruction sequences, we process benign input data using the
same approach.
It is noteworthy that we start ASL-guided disassembly from
EVERY byte of the input data. This is because we are dealing
with data, so code or memory alignment actually does not
apply, and any four-bytes can be an address. In fact, in Fig-
ure 1, we also treat the four-byte data at n+1 (0x6af09441),
n+2(0xf0944141) and n+3(0x94414141) as addresses and
start ASL-guided disassembly. Though they do not lead to
gadget-like instruction sequences and are ignored in the sub-
sequent analysis.
5 Real Gadget Chain Generation
The real gadget chain dataset is created by chaining real in-
dividual gadgets together. There are several existing tools to
automate gadget chains generation; e.g., rp++ [42], ROPgad-
get [43], ropper [44], PSHAPE [45], ROPER [46]. However,
the existing tools cannot be directly used to generate the real
gadget chain dataset due to three main reasons: 1. The number
of generated gadget chains is small. Many existing tools usu-
ally build ROP exploits for one specific scenario; e.g., execve
or mprotect, which leads to a small number of real gadget
chains. 2. Existing tools usually use gadgets whose lengths are
as short as possible to reduce side-effects on other registers,
the stack, or flags. This makes the dataset not comprehensive.
3. The generated gadget chains might cause crashes due to
accesses of unmapped memory.
We decide to generate the real gadget chains in a new way.
Our idea is to first generate a lot of candidates, and then filter
out those invalid ones. We use ROPgadget [43] to extract
individual gadgets from the program binary. Then the gadgets
are added to the chain in such a way that every register is
initialized before the chain dereferences it, as the execution
may otherwise lead to a crash. To avoid crashes, we have to
solve the side effect of gadgets. Take two gadgets “mov [esi],
0x1; ret;” and “mov eax, 0x1; jmp [esi];” for instance. There
exists a side effect caused by the gadget “mov eax, 0x1; jmp
[esi];” unintendedly changing the value of EAX, and a register
usage conflict for ESI, which is used for setting a memory as
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0x1 and setting the target address for jump instructions. To
solve the side effects, we remove all the gadgets that contain
the memory usages, and make sure that no two gadgets read
one register without write operation between them. To make
the dataset more comprehensive, we also combine both short
and long gadgets.
After that, we use the CPU emulator Unicorn [47] to val-
idate the generated gadget chains. We first analyze how the
individual gadgets interact with the stack pointer. For exam-
ple, if a gadget pops two integers into registers, we know
that after the execution of this gadget, the new esp value will
become esp+0xc. We arrange the addresses of gadgets on
the stack inside Unicorn according to their stack interaction.
We then start emulation from the first gadget and observe if
the gadgets can be executed one-by-one correctly. If not, this
gadget chain is filtered out. One exception to the emulation
is all function calls (e.g. call eax) are assumed successful
and the corresponding function call is skipped. In this way,
we make sure the generated gadget chains are all valid (they
are not necessarily useful for attackers).
We can generate a huge amount of real gadget chains in
this way. However, if we contain too many real gadget chains
in the training data, the neural network will tend to classify
more samples as a real gadget chain, which can lead to higher
false positives. To avoid this, we generate the same amount of
real gadget chains as gadget-chain-like instruction sequences.
Furthermore, we make sure the length (in bytes) distribu-
tion of the real gadget chain datasets is similar to that of
the gadget-chain-like instruction sequence dataset; otherwise,
even if the classifier does a good job to distinguish the two
datasets, it may leverage the length information too much
rather than learn anything about the data.
6 Neural Network Classification
We formulate the ROP payloads detection problem as a classi-
fication problem where our goal is to discriminate ROP gadget
chains from gadget-chain-like instruction sequences. We now
need to tackle two main challenges in order to successfully ap-
ply deep neural networks. First, deep neural networks require
a huge amount of training data to perform well. For example,
deep neural networks perform worse than some traditional
classifiers when the dataset has less than 100 samples [48]. As
mentioned in Section 4.2 and Section 5, it is challenging to get
a large number of gadget-chain-like instruction sequences. In
fact, we use ASL-guided disassembly to disassemble TB level
of raw input data to generate enough instruction sequences
(please refer to Section 7.1). Second, different types of deep
neural networks are suitable for different types of data; e.g.,
convolutional neural networks (CNN) work well in image
classification since the data has spatial structures [49], and
recurrent neural networks (RNN) with long short-term mem-
ory (LSTM) [50] can deal with temporal structures in spoken
language. It is very important to design the correct architec-
ture of the deep neural network according to the nature of
instruction sequence data in our task.
6.1 Data Representation and Preprocessing
In order to make our two datasets (i.e., the gadget-chain-like
instruction sequences and the real gadget chains) tractable for
the neural network, we need to convert every instruction in
them into numerical data. Recall that instructions are binary
data by nature. We first convert every byte in an instruction
sequence into its hex value (0-255). For example, the instruc-
tion sequence “mov eax, 0x1; pop edx; ret” is converted to
“[0xb8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5a, 0xc3]”.
We can simply scale these values to 0-1 by a division of 255
and then input them into the neural network. However, this is
inappropriate for our data. Since neural networks multiply the
input data with certain weight parameters, such representation
leads to an implicit relative order between different byte val-
ues. For example, in the above example, the neural network
implicitly assumes the “ret” (0xc3) is larger than “pop edx”
(0x5a), which is meaningless regarding instructions.
To address this problem, we instead use one-hot encoding.
We represent each byte value by a 256× 1 vector, with all but
one positions to be zero, and the position that corresponds to
the byte value to be one. For example, the “ret” (0xc3, 195)
will be represented by {0,...,0,1,0,...,0}, where we have 195
zeros in front of the one, and 60 zeros behind the one.
In other words, an instruction sequence that has n bytes
is represented by X = {−→X1,−→X2, ...,−→Xn}, where −→Xi is a 256×1
one-hot vector. Alternatively, one can view the input as a n
by 256 matrix.
Since instruction sequences usually have different lengths,
padding is applied to make them have the same length. We
first find the longest instruction sequence (in bytes). For
shorter ones, we append the one-byte nop (0x90) instruction
at the end of them until they all reach the same length.
An alternative way to preprocess the data is to do word
embedding [51], which is widely used in Natural Language
Processing (NLP). Word embedding maps every word in the
data to a fixed length vector. In the evaluation section, we
show that embedding, compared to one-hot encoding, pro-
vides similar accuracy while requires longer training time.
Consequently, one-hot encoding is more suitable for our task.
6.2 Architecture of the Deep Neural Network
After the data preprocessing, we use a customized neural
network to classify whether a potential gadget chain is benign
or real. The architecture of our neural network (shown in
Fig. 4) is a convolutional neural network (CNN), which is
a feed-forward neural network that is good at learning data
with spatial structures and capturing their local dependencies.
Typically, a CNN has one input layer, multiple convolution
layers, multiple activation layers, and one output layer. In
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Figure 3: Data Representation and the first 1D Convolution
Layer
particular, all of the convolution layer in the network is 1D
convolution layer which is shown in Figure 3.
The 1D convolution layer involves a mathematical opera-
tion called convolution. Suppose X represents the one-hot
encoded instruction bytes, w represents the convolution ker-
nel (weight vector) whose length is m. Then the convolution
between X and w is a matrix X ∗w, whose ith column can be
written as:
(X ∗w)i =
m
∑
j=1
Xi− j+m/2 ·w j (1)
The convolution aggregates information from adjacent
bytes. This information includes certain byte values, the or-
dering of bytes, etc. The convolution layer is followed by
a nonlinear activation layer (e.g., ReLU) to denote whether
certain information is present or not. We stack three layers of
convolution and activation to gradually capture higher level
of information of the input bytes, e.g. the presence of a cer-
tain gadget, the ordering of different gadgets, the repetition
of certain patterns, etc. The higher level of information is
more abstract and difficult to extract or represent (similar to
the case in image classification), but it is more related to the
classification task, i.e., whether the chain is benign or real.
The last activation layer is followed by a fully connected layer
and another activation layer output to give a classification
output, benign (0) or real (1).
Since the input X is fixed, only the weights w influence
the output. These values are not determined via heuristics
or expert knowledge, as in many previous ROP detection
methods. Instead, they are trained (recursively updated) by
minimizing the differences between the true labels and the
network’s outputs. For details about CNN, please refer to
[52, 53].
The architecture of our neural network is illustrated in Fig-
ure 4, which is a zoom-in version of the CNN in Figure 2.
We first use a convolutional layer with 64 convolution fil-
ters with the kernel size of 7 (length of the convolution filter
is 7). Then we perform batch normalization (BN) before a
nonlinear activation function, which in this case is a recti-
fied linear unit (ReLU). ReLU is a simple rectifier with the
form of f (x) = max(x,0). After the ReLU activation, we ap-
ply a 50% dropout to prevent overfitting. Then we repeat
this Convolution-BN-ReLU-Dropout structure for two more
times. In particular, we use 32 convolutional kernels with the
size of 5 and 16 convolutional kernels with size 3 for the next
two layers. Then the output from the last Convolution-BN-
ReLU-Dropout structure is feed into a fully connected layer.
Finally, we use the softmax activation function as a classifier.
It is worth mentioning that we do not include pooling layers
which are widely used in image classification tasks, because
our entire input is meaningful and downsampling our input
vector would yield a completely different gadget chain.
We use a grid search [54] to fine-tune the above config-
urable hyper-parameters (e.g., dropout rate, the filter sizes,
etc) in our model and find the best set of values. Details are
provided in Section 7.
This network includes some modern techniques in deep
learning such as BN [55] and dropout [56] to improve the per-
formance. BN is a method to reduce internal covariance shift
by normalizing the layer inputs in the neural network [55],
and has been shown to improve learning. Dropout is a simple
way to prevent a neural network from overfitting by randomly
dropping a percentage of neurons during the training phase.
These methods have been widely used in recent years and
seen great successes.
6.3 Training CNN
We train the CNN after collecting training samples (gadget-
chain-like instruction sequences and real gadget chains) for
a specific program. We use an optimization procedure called
stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with learning rate 0.1 and
momentum [57]. In particular, we input a mini-batch of the
training samples into the network, then compute the outputs,
the errors and the gradients for the input. The gradients are
calculated by backpropagation to determine how the network
should update its internal weights; e.g., w1,w2 and w3 in Fig-
ure 3, which are used to compute the representation in each
layer from the representation in the previous layer. We repeat
this process for many mini-batches until the errors converge
or the maximum training epoch is reached. In practice, we
also test another optimizer, i.e., Adam, and both the accuracy
and the convergence speed are similar to those of the SGD,
so we choose to use SGD as our optimizer.
Note we set forth a goal (R2) to reach close to zero false
positive rate for the ROPNN. This is motivated by the fact that
false positives can really irritate the system admin and under-
mine the usefulness of the detection method, or even impact
its security. To reduce the false positive rate, we use a com-
mon technique, i.e., penalizing false positives more than false
negatives. Specifically, we use the notation of “penalizing fac-
tor” to describe how much more a false positive contributes to
the loss function compared to a false negative. A penalizing
factor 1 means no difference between a false positive and a
false negative, while a penalizing factor of 5 means a false
positive contributes to the loss 5 times more than a false neg-
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Figure 4: Architecture of the CNN used in ROPNN
ative does. In the evaluation section, we empirically decide a
value to achieve a very low false positive rate and a still high
detection rate.
7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate ROPNN on real-world programs.
In particular, we want to answer the following questions. 1.
Does ROPNN has high detection rates and low false positive
rates for multiple programs? 2. Can ROPNN detect real-world
ROP exploits? 3. Can ROPNN detect ROP exploits that can
bypass other ROP detection methods, e.g., CFI? 4. Is the
speed of ROPNN satisfiable?
We train a CNN for each of the five tested programs, namely
nginx 1.4.0, apache 2.4.18, proftpd 1.3.0a, vsftpd 3.03, Im-
ageMagcik 7.08, respectively. The tested programs are widely
adopted server-side applications (i.e., web servers, ftp servers,
image processor). We compile, execute and memory-dump
them on Ubuntu 16.04 32bit system. Note one specific CNN
should be trained for one program because the (training + test-
ing) dataset for one program is different from that for other
programs. We collect and create 20 working ROP exploits for
each of the five tested programs and ROPNN successfully de-
tects all of them. ROPNN can also detect all 10 ROP exploits
that bypass CFI.
7.1 How is Big Data Used to Generate Benign
Training Dataset?
Collecting abundant training data is one of the most challeng-
ing tasks when utilizing the neural network. We use the fol-
lowing three input datasets to generate the gadget-chain-like
instruction sequences: (A) a medium size HTTP traffic dataset
in [58]; (B) all images in ImageNet [59] (1.2 TB in total);
(C) all PDF files from arXiv [60] (800 GB in total). We use
all (A)(B)(C) for the two web servers, i.e., nginx and apache,
to do ASL-guided disassembly (described in Section 4) and
generate gadget-chain-like instruction sequences. Similarly,
we use all (B) for the image processor (i.e., ImageMagick),
and all (B)(C) for the two ftp servers (i.e., proftpd and vsftpd)
to do the same job. As a summary, we consider all valid inputs
for the target program. For example, all three datasets all typ-
ical traffic that pass web servers; image processor, however,
only deals with images.
To quickly process the huge amount of data, we use a
Google Cloud Platform instance with 96 vCPUs. The memory
dump size, input data, generation time, and the number of gen-
erated gadget-chain-like instruction sequences are shown in
Table 2. As a brief summary, we generate 26k to 105k gadget-
chain-like instruction sequences for different programs, re-
spectively.
It can be verified here that we do need a classifier in ROPNN.
Otherwise, if we simply do ASL-guided disassembly on input
data and treat all potential gadget chains as real gadget chains,
all gadget-chain-like instruction sequences generated above
will become false positives.
As explained in Section 5, for each program, we generate
the same number of real gadget chains as gadget-chain-like
instruction sequences. The generation is rapid and is done
on a local workstation. Now that we have five datasets for
the five programs, respectively. Each of them contains two
smaller datasets: the gadget-chain-like instruction sequences
and the real gadgets chains, which have the same number of
samples.
7.2 Tuning the hyper-parameters of ROPNN
Hyper-parameter tuning is a very important aspect of deep
learning applications. Different hyper-parameter sets can lead
to very different results. In this subsection, we use grid
search [54] to empirically find the best hyper-parameters
for our CNN. Grid search exhaustively searches the hyper-
parameter space to look for the combination of hyper-
parameters that yields the best result. In ROPNN, we have
a handful of hyper-parameters and the grid search works well.
We implement our model using Keras [61] and run it on
NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU. We ran the experiment under
each setting for three times and take the average value of
the accuracy. This averaged accuracy is the primary factor to
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Program MemoryDump Size HTTP Data ImageNet
arXiv
PDF
Input
Data Size
Generation
Time
# of Gadget-Chain-Like
Instruction Sequences # of Real Gadget Chains
nginx 1.4.0 3.2 MB X X X 2 TB 7 hours 40,674 40,674
apache 2.4.18 3.7 MB X X X 2 TB 7 hours 81,127 81,127
proftpd 1.3.0a 2.4 MB × X X 2 TB 7 hours 26,020 26,020
vsftpd 3.03 4.5 MB × X X 2 TB 7 hours 105,057 105,057
ImageMagick 7.08 8.5 MB × X × 1.2 TB 4 hours 46,224 46,224
Table 2: Generation of Gadget-Chain-Like Instruction Sequences
compare different hyper-parameter settings. However, simply
rely on accuracy leads to a problem. For example, let us
assume 128 convolution filters already leads to the best result.
Doubling the number and make it 256 is likely to be a waste
of training time – but the accuracy might see a tiny increase,
say 0.05%. So we also consider how fast the hyper-parameters
lead to the convergence of error rate, measured in training
epochs. If hyper-parameter set a is less than 0.05% better than
set b in accuracy, but at the same time the training epochs is
20% more, we favor set b. In this way, we can not only get
high accuracy, but also avoid unnecessary training time.
We use the nginx dataset to fine-tune the hyper-parameters.
We split the whole dataset into two subsets: a training dataset
that is 80% of the whole dataset (80% of the samples from
both labels), selected at random; a test dataset that is the rest
20% of the samples. We use the training dataset to train the
model and fine-tune the hyper-parameters.
The parameters we aim to tune and their corresponding
candidate values are listed in Table 3. After a grid search, we
find the best set of hyper-parameters, which is highlighted in
Table 3 (these are also the values included in Section 6). We
achieve 99.6% accuracy under this best setting.
Hyper-parameters Candidate Values
# of filters (32, 16, 8)2, (48, 24, 12), (64, 32, 16),
(96, 48, 24), (128, 64, 32)
filter size (3, 3, 3), (5, 3, 3), (5, 5, 3), (7, 5, 3),
(9, 5, 3), (9, 7, 5)
dropout rate 0.2, 0.5, 0.8
learning rate 1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.001
Table 3: Candidate values and the best value of hyper-
parameters for ROPNN
We also consider using word embedding to preprocess the
data, which works very well in NLP. But it does not help in
our task. It produces similar accuracy to one-hot encoding but
the required training time is 30% longer. The longer training
time can be explained by the fact the embedding layer itself
needs to be trained along with the deep neural network. Also,
instruction sequences are inherently different from language
data, so the embedding is unable to improve the result.
We do not use grid search to find the best penalizing fac-
tor (introduced in Section 6.3). In fact, we not only want to
minimize the false positive rate, we also want to maintain a
high accuracy. However, using penalizing factor to decrease
false positive rate inevitably increase false negative rate and
2This means the first layer has 32 filters, the second has 16, and the third
has 8. The notation for filter size is interpreted in the same way
may impact the overall accuracy, so a decision on the bal-
ance is better made manually. To illustrate this, we test an
extremely large penalizing factor, 100, and the false positive
rate is 0. However, the false negative rate is high and the
overall accuracy drops to 92%, which is undesirable. On the
other hand, if we use a trivial penalizing factor 1, the false
positive is 0.1%. After manually testing several penalizing
factors, we find a factor of 5 to be a good balance, where the
false positive rate is 0.01% and the detection rate is 99.3%.
Since we have same amount of samples for the two labels,
so accuracy = (detection rate+(1− f alse positive rate))/2,
thus the overall accuracy is still 99.6%.
A quick estimation demonstrates what 0.01% false positive
rate means in real world. Suppose a web server receives 10TB
incoming traffic per day, since the number of potential gadget
chains is rather small (40, 674 out of 2TB benign data), it is
estimated only 20 false positives will be reported in 24 hours.
Note the 10TB incoming traffic is equivalent to 1Gbps all the
time during 24 hours, which is not a trivial amount, so the
estimation is not under-estimating.
7.3 Can ROPNN Accurately Detect Gadget
Chains in the Test Dataset?
In this subsection, we evaluate the accuracy of ROPNN against
the five commonly used programs.
For every program, we select 80% of the dataset as train-
ing data the rest 20% as test data. We use the best hyper-
parameters from the previous subsection, make 5-fold cross
validation and the evaluation result is shown in Table 4. We
reach 99.3% detection rate and 0.01% false positive rate for
nginx 1.4.0, 98.7% detection rate and 0.04% false positive rate
for apache 2.4.18, 98.3% detection rate and 0.05% false posi-
tive rate for proftpd 1.3.0a, 99.5% detection rate and 0.02%
false positive rate for vsftpd 3.03, and 98.1% detection rate
and 0.02% false positive rate for ImageMagick 7.08, respec-
tively. As we can see from the results, ROPNN has very high
detection rates and very low false positive rates, and work
well on different programs.
The high accuracy shows that roughly 50k-100K samples
are sufficient to train an accurate classifier for potential gad-
get chains. In contrast, for image classification, millions of
samples are required to train neural networks [59].
Besides CNN, there are also other candidate classifiers, e.g.,
RNN (LSTM), MLP and SVM. Our evaluation shows that
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the CNN is best suitable for this particular task. Due to space
limitation, detailed comparisons are shown in Appendix 9.
It is also noteworthy that the best hyper-parameters tuned
on nginx dataset work well across different programs. This
indicates although the specific instruction sequences are dif-
ferent in different programs (thus a dedicated CNN is needed),
it has something in common across different programs.
We observe that the training time roughly increases linearly
proportional to the size of the training data. However, once
the neural network is trained, the test speed is fast and less
sensitive to the amount of test data. In the first row, it only
takes 0.6 seconds to classify all test data for nginx (20% of
all samples, 16,270 in total).
We also test what would happen if the amount of training
data is small. In particular, we train the same model with 5%
of the nginx data (4K samples). We achieve 95.1% detection
rate and 1.2% false positive rate. They are considerably infe-
rior to the best achievable result. It validates that deep neural
networks work better with larger training data since the net-
works can discover intricate features in large data sets instead
of over-fitting small training data and missing key features.
7.4 Can ROPNN Accurately Detect Real-
World ROP Exploits?
In this subsection, we test ROPNN against real-world ROP
exploits that are collected in-the-wild or generated by ROP
exploit generation tools (i.e., Ropper [44] and ROPC [62]).
The motivations behind these experiments are two-fold.
Firstly, in the previous subsection, we show that the trained
deep neural network of ROPNN is an accurate classifier with
a high detection rate and low false positive rate. However,
despite our efforts to make the real gadget chains valid, they
are not necessarily useful from an attacker’s point of view.
Therefore, we need a more direct evaluation here to show
ROPNN is able to detect real-world ROP exploits (that are
not part of the training data). Secondly, since the real gadget
chains are directly generated (not from ASL-guided disassem-
bly), we also need to show the ASL-guided disassembly is
capable of correctly identify the addresses of gadgets in a real
gadget chain, which is the basis for our approach.
Among the five tested programs, nginx and proftpd have
known vulnerabilities and we directly exploit them with ROP
attack. For the rest three, we use the latest version so there
is no known vulnerability. Instead, we inject a trivial stack
buffer overflow vulnerability into each of them to make the
exploiting possible. In fact, as long as the exploit is a ROP
attack, the underlying detail of the vulnerability has nothing
to do with the effectiveness of our method, so the injected
vulnerabilities do not undermine our evaluation.
For each vulnerable program, we first obtain one ROP ex-
ploit that leads to a shell. For nginx, we use the attack script
published in BROP [63]. For proftpd, we use the attack script
published in Exploite-DB [64] but change it to launch a ROP
attack. For each of the rest three, we create a working exploit
that leads to a shell. After that, we manually mutate the exploit
to generate 4-5 more samples for testing. For example, we can
exchange the order of several ROP gadgets without changing
the behavior of the exploit. We also substitute gadgets with
new gadgets that have the same effects.
To further create test samples, we use Ropper [44] to gener-
ate ROP exploits that execute mprotect or execve. Ropper can
generate different exploits because we can block the used gad-
gets and force it to generate new ones. Meanwhile, we create
ROP exploits with ROPC [62], which is a ROP compiler that
can compile scripts written in a special type of language (ROP
Language, ROPL) into a gadget chain. Although in Section 5
we are unable to use these tools to generate a large number of
real gadget chains, it successfully generate sufficient amount
of samples for us to test ROPNN.
To sum up, for each of the five vulnerable programs, we
collect and create 20 ROP exploits. All of them are manually
verified to be working. i.e., achieving their designed function-
ality, for example getting a shell or executing mprotect.
We then test ROPNN against all of the 100 exploits. We
first observe that the ASL-guided disassembly successfully
extracts the gadget addresses embedded in the payload and ob-
tains the corresponding instruction sequences. Subsequently,
the DNN correctly classifies all of the potential gadget chains
as real gadget chains. This demonstrates the ASL-guided
disassembler and the neural network synergize well and the
system works as designed. ROPNN is able to detect real-world
ROP exploits.
Thanks to the generalization capacity of DNN, the detec-
tion capacity of ROPNN is not restricted to the ROP attacks
it sees during training. In fact, it detects the blind ROP at-
tack which is not part of the training data. Furthermore, ROP
exploits generated by ROPC can have more than 100 gad-
gets, which are three times longer than the longest one in the
training dataset. They are also correctly detected.
7.5 Comparison between ROPNN and CFI
We compare ROPNN with CFI, a real-world ROP detection
(and prevention) method that is already being deployed in
production systems. Specifically, we evaluate Bin-CFI, the
CFI implementation proposed in [65].
Bin-CFI first disassembles the stripped binary and then
statically analyze the direct and indirect call/jmp targets. Bin-
CFI overcomes several difficulties and can eliminate 93% of
the gadgets in the program [65]. Bin-CFI is considered one
of the strongest forms of CFI implementation [66, 67].
As mentioned earlier, static point-to analysis is a very chal-
lenging task. Consequently, Bin-CFI cannot guarantee it al-
ways validates the control flow transfer targets precisely. Davi
et al. [66] observe that Bin-CFI does not (cannot) validate the
integrity of the pointers in the global offset table (GOT) since
they are initialized at runtime. They build a gadget chain to
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Program CVE-ID # of Chains forTraining Detection Rate
False Positive
Rate Training Time Classification Speed
nginx 1.4.0 2013-2028 65,078 99.3% 0.01% 45min 27,116 chains/s
apache 2.4.18 N/A 129,803 98.7% 0.04% 94min 27,120 chains/s
proftpd 1.3.0a 2008-2950 41,632 98.3% 0.05% 31min 26,730 chains/s
vsftpd 3.03 N/A 168,091 99.5% 0.02% 118min 26,020 chains/s
ImageMagick 7.08 N/A 73,958 98.1% 0.02% 55min 27,231 chains/s
Table 4: Evaluation results on five tested programs
first maliciously overwrite a GOT entry and then invoke the
desired function from the GOT, which is allowed by Bin-CFI.
For each of the five program tested by us, we adopt the same
trick to build two ROP exploits that can bypass Bin-CFI: one
directly calls execve, and another uses mprotect to make
the stack executable and then executes the shellcode from it.
ROPNN successfully detects all of the ten ROP exploits.
The other pros and cons of ROPNN and CFI are as fol-
lows. One advantage of ROPNN over CFI is on the runtime
overhead. CFI typically has a considerable runtime overhead,
especially fine-grained CFI, since they have a stricter policy
and require more checks. Conversely, ROPNN is transpar-
ent to the protected program and does not incur any runtime
overhead (please refer to the next subsection). Additionally,
ROPNN also does not need to instrument the program or mod-
ify the compiler. One advantage of CFI over ROPNN is that
CFI may stop the ROP exploit in action but ROPNN is not a
blocker. Nevertheless, IDS is designed to detect the attacks
and enable other defense reactions.
7.6 Throughput of ROPNN
We now consider the throughput of ROPNN on nginx. We use
throughput, rather than latency, as the performance criteria
because ROPNN is an IDS and it does not block the traffic.
In other words, ROPNN exerts zero runtime overhead for the
protected program.
We can calculate from Table 2 that the disassembler works
at a speed of 665 Mb/s, which can match the traffic on a
server that is not too busy. Moreover, since the ASL-guided
disassembly can be parallelized very well, we can split the
workload across multiple servers running ROPNN, further
increasing the throughput.
The CNN in ROPNN can classify 27k potential gadget
chains in one second. We observe the number of potential
gadget chains is rather small. On average, in the 665 Mb data
processed within one second, only 13 potential gadget chains
are fed into the neural network for classification. Thus, the
performance of the entire IDS is bounded by the speed of
disassembly and the overall throughput is 665 Mb/s.
8 Discussion and Limitations
Readers may wonder how can ROPNN work if the traffic is
encrypted (e.g., HTTPS). Encryption can hide the addresses
of ROP gadgets and hinder the ASL-guided disassembly. The
solution is to deploy ROPNN between the point of encryption
and the protected program. For example, when a reverse proxy
is deployed in front of a web-server to provide encryption,
then ROPNN should be deployed between the reverse proxy
and the web-server. Now ROPNN sees the unencrypted HTTP
traffic and works in its normal way.
Our IDS can cooperate well with Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR). The two gadget chain datasets only
contain instructions, not addresses. So the CNN is not affected
by different memory layout. Meanwhile, when a server pro-
gram is newly launched (thus a new memory space layout is
created), we update the memory snapshot used by ROPNN. In
this way, the disassembler always works on the current image
of the running program. So the result from the disassembler
is also accurate. Given these two observations combined, we
find that our IDS can work in conjunction with ASLR, further
raising the bar for attackers.
Note the memory space layout remains stable after the ini-
tial randomization (even in fine-grained ASLR). So the update
does not happen very often and does not incur high runtime
overhead (if any). Take nginx for an example, although sev-
eral work processes are created, they are forked from the
master process and their memory layouts are the same.
Readers may notice our criteria for a potential gadget in
Section 4.1 is relatively broad and it may allow non-gadgets.
The reason is that we do not want to let any real ROP gadgets
evade the disassembly engine and further bypass the detection.
It makes our approach more robust and harder to bypass. But
we showed this does not lead to too many false positives.
In case of a patch or an update, whether the neural network
needs to be re-trained depends on the detailed change of the
program. If a part (e.g., a function) of the program is removed
and this section happens to be present in some gadget chains,
then these gadget chains should be removed from the dataset.
If some instructions or functions are inserted into the program,
it is very likely that the original gadget chains are still valid
and there is no need to regenerate the dataset or re-train the
neural network. Since training our neural network is not very
time consuming, this kind of infrequent re-train is affordable.
ROP attack is getting more and more complex and has
several variants. ROPNN is able to detect polymorphic ROP
attacks [68] because there always have to be some un-
masqueraded ROP gadgets to unpack, decrypt, or arrange
the real attacking gadgets. ROPNN can detect these un-
masqueraded ROP gadgets. On the other hand, some recent
variations of ROP, e.g, JIT-ROP, that leverages a JavaScript
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environment to launch the attack, can potentially bypass our
detection. However, unless the ROP attack is planned and
launched ENTIRELY from JavaScript (which is considerably
complex [8]), we can still detect it. For example, if the attacker
uses JavaScript to leak certain memory information or arrange
the heap layout, and then launch ROP attack through the net-
work, ROPNN can still detect the ROP exploit. Meanwhile,
high profile targets for ROP attacks, e.g., server programs,
seldom provide a JavaScript environment.
9 Conclusion
ROPNN is a novel intrusion detection system that leverages
the power of deep neural networks to classify potential gadget
chains produced by an ASL-guided disassembler. We show
that ROPNN has a high detection rate and a very low false
positive rate. It also successfully detects all of the real-world
ROP exploits collected or created by us. Meanwhile, it is non-
intrusive and does not incur runtime overhead. We argue that
ROPNN is a practical widely-deployable detection method
against ROP attacks.
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Appendix A ROPNN V.S. LSTM, MLP or
SVM
In this appendix, we compare the performance of ROPNN to
that of combining ASL-guided disassembly with other well-
known classifiers, i.e., LSTM (one type of RNN), Multiple-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) and Support Vector Machine (SVM).
These three competitors are also widely used and produce
many good results [69–71]. Specifically, we use an LSTM
with 96 hidden units, an MLP with three fully-connected
layers with 32 units in each layer, and an SVM with the radial
basis function (RBF) kernels, and And we use 80% of Nginx
dataset for training. The results are shown in Table 5.
The combination of ASL-guided disassembly and MLP
leads to 96.9% detection rate and 22.2% false positive rate.
The combination of ASL-guided disassembly and SVM leads
to 77.6% detection rate and 42.4% false positive rate. These
two false positive rates are too high for practical application
because they can easily cause denial of service. LSTM reaches
a 97.8% detection rate and 0.2% false positive rate, which is
still far from CNN’s result. Also, LSTM takes 3 times longer
to train.
The result is not surprising. In fact, RNN (or LSTM) is
more suitable for temporal data [52] whereas our instruction
sequence data is more spatial in nature. MLP uses fully con-
nected layer that is known to be hard to train. Using the same
amount of data, it does not achieve comparable accuracy to
CNN. The SVM is not good at directly dealing with minimally
preprocessed data and it requires certain feature engineering
to first extract features from the input data. In summary, CNN
is superior to its three competitors and more suitable to the
task.
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Method Detection Rate False Positive Rate Training Time Classification Speed
ROPNN 99.3% 0.01% 45min 27,116 chains/s
ASL-guided & LSTM 97.8% 0.2% 143min 7,150 chains/s
ASL-guided & MLP 96.9% 22.2% 26min 85,629 chains/s
ASL-guided & SVM 77.6% 42.4% 12min 310 chains/s
Table 5: Comparison of ROPNN, LSTM, MLP and SVM on nginx
16
